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Unraveling the Differences between Countervailing Duty and
Antidumping Data
Abstract: This paper documents significant differences in U.S. antidumping (AD) and
countervailing duty (CVD) activity and outcomes over time despite administration of
these trade protection programs by the same U.S. agencies.  CVD cases diminish over
time and show little change in the average duty assessed since 1980.  In contrast, AD
cases over the same time period have maintained a high level of activity, as the average
duty has increased fourfold.  After documenting these differences, the paper develops a
model to explain a firm’s decision to petition for the two types of trade protection and
hypothesize about the reasons driving their decisions.  A main assertion of the model is
that there is less room for agency discretion in CVD cases and a regression analysis using
recently compiled CVD data finds confirmatory evidence.
Approved:   __________________________________________________
Prof. Bruce Blonigen                                                    Date
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1.  Introduction
A well-established literature has examined the economics and political economy of
antidumping (AD) laws and their consequences.1 Despite similar legal and administrative
institutions governing their application, there is a relative paucity of work examining the
economics of countervailing duty (CVD) laws.  An obvious explanation for this is the
difference in actual real-world activity between AD and CVD cases. As shown in figure
1, U.S. AD activity has been substantial since well-known legal changes in 1980.2  Prusa
(2001) demonstrates a strong rise in AD activity worldwide.  The boom in recent AD
activity has spawned a rich array of papers discussing the effects of resulting
antidumping duties (ADD).
As shown in figure 1, U.S. CVD case activity follows no such trend.  Filings
occurred in numbers similar to AD in the early 1980’s.  By the mid 1980’s we begin to
see a decline in CVD filings, and a growing infrequency relative to AD filings.   There is
a pronounced drop in CVD and AD activity in 1995 upon the implementation of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Soon after this change, AD activity
quickly returns to similar levels before the change, but CVD does not follow suit.  From
1995 to 2004 there were only 72 CVD petitions resulting in 57 CVD orders in the U.S.
Across the world during the same period, the next highest number of orders came from
the European Community with 18 and Canada with 10 (U.S. GAO (2005), 39).  Chad
Bown’s AD database demonstrates that the disparity between the U.S. and other countries
in CVD cases relative to AD cases is not limited to the period from 1995-2004.  Bown
                                                
1 See Blonigen and Prusa, 2003, for a survey of the recent literature.
2 For a thorough treatment of the history of AD see Irwin (2004).
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compiled information regarding all CVD activity in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.  The
data clearly shows the sporadic and infrequent occurrence of CVD cases in Canada and
Mexico.
Living in the shadow of AD research, CVDs are frequently glossed over.  CVDs are
briefly addressed in many AD research papers, but have received little direct analysis.
The difference in real-world activity in AD and CVD cases appears to be an open
question without any well-formulated hypotheses as to its explanation.  As a first step to
understanding differences in AD and CVD activity, this paper will illuminate some key
differences between AD and CVD practices by econometrically analyzing case-specific
CVD data.   When compared to previous analyses of AD activity, fundamental
differences in the treatment and outcomes from the two methods of protection become
clear.  This may shed light on the recent trend for countries to favor AD action over CVD
action.
The paper will continue as follows in an attempt to highlight the possible reasons
behind meager CVDs relative to the average ADD. The next section will give a brief
overview of CVD and AD calculation methodology showing the similarity in the
processes for both, and highlighting some fundamental differences between the two.
Next, I will use descriptive statistics to further demonstrate the observed differences, and
postulate on possible explanations for the dissimilarities.  I will then develop a simple
model for a firm’s choice to file for trade protection, and what type of protection to file
for.  My hypothesis that most of the discretionary factors shown to drive the upward trend
in ADDs do not exist, or have a counterpart in CVD methodology, which is the source of
CVDs that seem paltry relative to ADDs.  I will support my hypothesis with a regression
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analysis of CVD data, which will make up the final sections of the paper.
2.  Duty Methodology
In the U.S., “interested” domestic firms who claim injury from an exporting
country’s goods must first file a petition for protection.  In a CVD case injury takes the
form of subsidies granted to exporters giving them an unfair cost advantage over
domestic producers.  In an AD case domestic firms claim injury from foreign firms that
are pricing below fair, or market, value.  The International Trade Commission (ITC)
preliminarily determines whether or not there is a threat of material injury to domestic
firms due to the imports under investigation.  If they see a threat of injury the case is sent
to the International Trade Administration (ITA), which makes a preliminary duty
determination to counteract the ill effects of these unfair trade practices.  If the ITA
determines an applicable duty greater than a set de minimus level,3 the case is sent back
to the ITC to make its final decision as to whether the subject merchandise is injuring
domestic firms.  If the ITC’s final determination is affirmative the case is sent to the ITA,
which adjusts its preliminary duty rate to capture any mistakes or new information, and if
its decision is affirmative and the rate is above the de minimus level the duty is put in
place.
2.1 CVD Calculation
 In a CVD case the ITA evaluates which programs are countervailable, and the
magnitude of these programs in order to determine a duty.  If the ITA determines foreign
                                                
3 1% ad valorem for cases against industrialized nations, and 2% for cases against
nonindustrialized nations.
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government subsidies exist, and are above a specified de minimus level, a suspension of
liquidation is set requiring all imports of the good subject to the investigation to be taxed
by the ad valorem percent determined by the ITA.  Determining the magnitude of a
subsidy is a simple calculation based upon an accepted formula.  If the subsidy is
contingent upon export performance its value is determined by dividing the amount of the
subsidy by the firm’s total exports.  In the case of a production subsidy, the amount of the
subsidy is divided by a firm’s total production.  Subsidy amounts and types are reported
by foreign firms along with their total production and exports in response to the survey
sent out by the ITA to firms under investigation.4  Therefore, there is little estimation
involved in the calculation of CVDs, which does not allow the ITA to use discretion
when calculating CVDs (See chapter two of U.S. ITC (1995) for a more detailed look at
the laws governing CVDs).  The explanation of AD procedures in the next section will
highlight the profound difference in the amount of discretionary practices used in duty
calculations that exist in AD compared to CVD.
The most scrutinized part of CVD calculation is the determination of which
programs are countervailable.  For example, Anspacher et. al.(1991) points out that a
duty put in place to counteract a production subsidy is frequently larger than what is
necessary.  The ITA assumes full pass-through of a production subsidy to exported
goods, which generates a duty larger than what is needed to counteract the effects of the
program on exports unless the ratio of the price elasticity of demand to the price elasticity
of supply in the home market equals zero (Anspacher, 107).  There exists a wide array of
                                                
4 See Anspacher et. al. (1991) for a description of the demands of the questionnaire.  The
authors assert that the extensive quantity of information requested places an unfair strain
on smaller firms within the investigation, and this procedural bias leads to a higher
frequency of best information available use.
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statute defining whether or not a program is subject to a duty, and how to calculate the
duty necessary to counteract the subsidy.  Therefore, little room exists for the ITA to use
discretion to inflate CVDs by calculating duties in varying ways, or considering extra
programs countervailable. The only discretionary practice used by the ITA to calculate
CVDs occurs if a firm does not reply to, or fully complete, their survey. Moore (2005)
creates a game theoretical model as to why firms would not participate in an AD case.  A
similar model for CVD would fall directly from Moore’s AD model.  In a scenario of
withheld information, the ITA attributes best information available (BIA).  These
practices are discretionary insofar as the ITA will use the values for subsidy magnitudes,
and firm sales activity as reported by the petitioning firms (which tend to inflate duties).
The ITA will also attribute the highest rate of any other subsidies that have been
determined to exist within the country under investigation from previous CVD cases to
nonrespondent firms.  BIA is punitive in nature, and I will show in my regression
analysis that such cases yield higher duties.  BIA demonstrates the potential heights
CVDs could reach if discretion was not checked within their methodology.
2.2 ADD Calculation
Calculating an ADD is a more intricate process for the ITA.  The ITA calculates
an ex factory price (the implicit price of the product immediately before it leaves the
factory) of a good destined for the U.S., and they compare it to a “fair” price in order to
determine the duty they must apply to counteract the difference between the two.  In
order to calculate ex factory prices the ITA backs out external cost from the final
consumer price.  “[Costs] include transportation and associated costs, tariffs and other
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taxes as well as markups by distributors.  It is assumed throughout these calculations that
pass-through of such costs by the firm is perfect (Blonigen (forthcoming, a), 5).”  Here
we see the first example of discretion used in the calculation of an ADD.  Ex factory
prices are unobservable, and their calculation is dependent on how costs are backed out
of observable prices. At best the assumption of full pass-through correctly calculates the
ex factory price, but most likely it deflates the export price which inflates the dumping
margin.
The ITA then makes “price-to-price” comparisons of the U.S. ex factory price to
the fair price in comparable periods within the period of investigation.  More
methodological discretion is used in how the ITA makes its price comparisons.  They use
a method called “zeroing.”  This practices considers a zero margin if the U.S. price is
greater than the fair price.  Baldwin and Moore (1991) discuss the flaws of this method,
and observe that “as long as prices vary over the sample period, a positive dumping
margin can be found even if prices in the two countries are identical on every day.” (pg.
271)
To calculate fair price of a product, the ITA uses a weighted average of a
country’s own market prices.  When the domestic price of the good cannot be observed
due to insufficient quantities of the good domestically, the ITA looks at an average of ex
factory prices of the good exported to other countries to attain fair price.  The decision of
which countries to examine is discretionary.  In the scenario of insufficient sales in a third
market and the domestic market the ITA must resort to “constructed value” of the normal
value.  To construct this value the ITA employs the foreign firm’s cost data from the
questionnaire to develop the firm’s total average cost.  They include a profit margin, and
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use the assumption of a perfectly competitive market to establish fair price as the
minimum of the firm’s average cost curve including the profit margin.  The ITA’s
constructed value is rife with discretion.  In a plethora of scenarios, including a firm
making a loss or a non-perfectly competitive market, it will yield a fair value that is
inflated which will lead to increased dumping margins when compared to U.S ex factory
prices.
Another situation where the ITA must use discretion to calculate a fair price
occurs when the case is filed against a country that operates under a non-market economy
such as China.  Blonigen (forthcoming, a) explains in this scenario, “Cost and price data
for such firms is nonexistent or meaningless from an economic/accounting perspective.
As a result, the USDOC calculates normal value through a “factors of production”
analysis using information from a “surrogate” country.”  The result is that the ITA
chooses a market economy that they deem similar to the economy under investigation
and use the cost structure of this country for analysis.  After adjusting for packaging
costs, transportation costs, and profits they develop a fair value.  The ITA’s choice of a
“surrogate” country is discretionary, and their adjustments allow them the possibility of
manipulating dumping margins.  Action against nonmarket economies is a key difference
between CVD and AD activity.  Due to precedent, the ITA does not pursue a CVD if it is
filed against a nonmarket economy.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2005)
discusses this precedent and its roots in the fact that too much discretion and construction
of the factors of a duty would be involved for CVDs to be justifiably pursued in such a
scenario.  This is a striking difference in practice from AD administration that seems to
embrace the use of discretion to calculate duties.
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As in a CVD case, the ITA will attribute BIA to a firm declining to respond to
their questionnaire in order to calculate dumping margins.  The punitive mindset is
similar for AD cases.  The amount of information necessary to calculate an ADD is
daunting, and as a result when information is missing the ITA will use what is provided
by the petitioners.  The petitioners have an incentive to see high duties, and use the ITA’s
discretionary practices to inflate their duty calculations.  Blonigen’s (2003) result that
BIA uses causes a significant increase in dumping margins comes as no surprise.  BIA
effectively allows the ITA to use their full range of discretion in their duty calculation.
The lack of discretion involved in CVDs leads me to infer that BIA will lead to less of an
increase in a CVD than the increase in an ADD shown by Blonigen (forthcoming, a).  
Blonigen (forthcoming, a) demonstrates econometrically that constructed value,
factors of production, and BIA when used in the calculation of ADDs cause significant
increases in the dumping margin holding all else constant.  He shows that these
discretionary practices alongside the inherent discretion in calculating an ADD are
driving the sharp growth of the average ADD in recent years.  It is apparent that even
though both duties are similar in their application, some fundamental differences between
the methodologies used to calculate ADDs and CVDs exist.  There are many options for
discretionary manipulation of ADDs ranging from how they make their comparisons, to
the country targeted by the petition.  CVD methodology clearly allows for less discretion
in the calculation of the duty (except in BIA cases), and methodologies do not differ by
the makeup of a country’s economy.  This results in ADDs that can be inflated through
discretion and CVDs that seem to be trapped by more rigid methodologies.  My
regression analysis of CVD data will show that discretionary practices, when in place,
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yield higher duties, and that the simple lack of discretionary procedures is what holds
CVDs in check.
3.  Descriptive Statistics
A simple analysis of comparative descriptive statistics for ADD and CVD data
clearly documents the recent departure of CVD action.  Figure 1 has already established
that CVD activity has dwindled in comparison to ADD activity.  Figure 2 plots
proportions of affirmative CVD and ADD cases since 1980.  Except for three years since
1980, the probability of a CVD resulting from a petition has been lower than AD.  The
three years wherein CVDs were more likely than ADDs are clearly insignificant when we
look at figure 3, which shows the total number of affirmative decisions for each type of
duty.  In the three years where a CVD seems more likely, there were less than five
affirmative decisions.  By fitting a line to the data in figure 2 we see that the probability
of an affirmative CVD decision is practically horizontal at a little below 40%.  AD, on
the other hand, exhibits an increasing trend from a 60% to an 80% probability of an ADD
resulting from a petition since 1980.
Another telling factor behind the appeal of AD to firms is the average duties
resulting from an affirmative decision.  Figure 4 uses data on country wide rates from
affirmative cases to break down the average duty by year for both CVDs and ADDs.
Country wide rates trade weighted averages of firm-specific duties for individual
products.  This will better represent the total amount of trade protection received by firms
from an affirmative decision against a particular product.  Both ADDs and CVDs display
similar magnitudes from 1980 until 1986 with ADDs consistently a fraction above CVDs.
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As early as 1987 though, there is a striking departure from this early trend.  The average
ADD quickly begins to rise while CVDs vacillate between 0 and 25%.  This trend
continues until 1997 when the average ADD sharply declines from 120% to 15%.  It is
interesting to observe that even with this sharp decline in response to the Uruguay round
agreements; the average ADD is still higher than its CVD counterpart.  After 1997, AD
quickly surpasses its previous pace and reaches a maximum average of 140% in 2004
with no sign of decreasing.  Alongside the drastic climbing of ADDs, CVDs maintained
their general average range between 0 and 25%.  We do see a spike in average CVD in
2002 where the recorded duties averaged over 60%, but in light of the fact that there were
only two affirmative duties that year, there is little significance in this observation.  I also
overlaid a three-year moving average for both CVD and ADD in figure 4 which smoothes
the spikes between observations, and better demonstrates the steadiness of CVDs and the
drastic climbing of ADDs.
It has been proven that BIA significantly increases ADDs.5  I will show that BIA
has a similar impact on CVDs.  Interestingly, there is a shocking difference in the
occurrence of BIA between the two.  Figure 7 documents the proportion of cases where
BIA played a part in the ITA’s determination of a duty.  I have used Blonigen’s (2003)
documentation of AD BIA up to 2000, and Michael Moore has provided me with the data
through 2002.  By juxtaposing this with CVD data that I have gathered from the Federal
Register the dissimilarities in the trends of BIA become obvious.  CVD’s receiving BIA
peak at around 35% of cases in 1988 and then drop into a static growth and decline that
reaches a maximum at a little over 20%, but is steadily at or below the 15% level through
                                                
5 See Blonigen (forthcoming, a) and Moore (2005) for intensive analyses of this assertion.
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2002.  ADD displays a higher proportion of BIA every year from 1984-2002.  Along with
consistently higher proportions, ADD BIA demonstrates a clear increasing trend
beginning in 1983 and reaching a maximum of about 50% in 1993.  Following 1993
ADD BIA has fallen into a similar fluctuation pattern as CVD.  The striking difference
between the similar patterns observed for CVDs and ADDs after 1993 is that BIA occurs
in a range of 30% to 45% of cases, triple that of CVDs.
4.  A Model of Firms’ Decision to File for Protection
It is common practice by the International Trade Association (ITA) to combine
CVD and ADD investigations when they are filed against the same product and exporting
country in conjunction.  Figure 5 shows the total number of such cases per year.  Until
1997 there is no obvious trend in alignment.  There seem to be unpredictable peaks and
valleys.  In 1997 there is an expected drop in the number of cases aligned corresponding
to the sharp decline in the number of cases filed overall this year.  Following 1997 there
is an increase in alignment that is similar to the recovery of ADD filings.  When
compared to the unpredictability of alignment in the years pre-1999, the systematic
decline we see from 1999-2004 is intriguing.  AD filings are increasing in this period, but
corresponding CVD filings are declining.  This leads me to believe that firms are
substituting out of CVD protection and into ADD, where in the past it was more common
to see the two types of protection filed together.
To further explain this trend, figure 6 looks at the probability of CVD and ADD
cases being aligned on a yearly basis by dividing the number aligned in that year by the
total number of cases filed.  We see that since 1990 the proportion of CVD cases aligned
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is consistently close to 1, except in 1997 where there was little trade protection activity
by the U.S., and no alignment.  This trend in the probability of alignment demonstrated
by CVDs indicates that a firm filing a CVD consistently filed a corresponding AD claim.
The probability of an AD case being aligned is historically low in comparison.  It shifts
between under 10% to a shade over 40% with no obvious trend until 1998.  From 1998-
2004 there is a pronounced downward trend in the probability of alignment.  This is
intriguing since we would expect that to file a CVD alongside an ADD is relatively
inexpensive since the fixed costs of filing have already been incurred.  This indicates that
firms are substituting completely out of CVD with increasing regularity.  The simple
model of a firm’s filing decisions to follow will hypothesize as to why this substitution is
occurring.
Blonigen (forthcoming, b) develops a model that breaks down a firm’s decision to
petition for AD protection.  For relevance to our issue, I have ignored prior filing
experience (E) in his model. I have added the term Rj, which will capture the level of
retaliation a firm would expect in response to filing a petition against a particular country.
Prusa (2001) has shown that AD is spreading throughout the world, thus the threat of
retaliation is increasing which suggests that Rj is an increasing function with respect to




A(DM(Zj), Zj) + f j
S(Xj) p j
S(Xj) + y(Xj, Zj) > FCADD + Rj
The set J includes each possible product and import source combination, and j Œ J.  An
affirmative or suspension decision following from a petition is denoted by superscripts A
and S respectively. f(.) represents the probability of the indicated decision for some
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country and product j.  p(.) is the expected profit from such a decision.
They are dependent on Zj or Xj.  Zj represents the effects of exogenous factors, including
petitioner characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, industry/product features, and the
nature of rivalry between the petitioner and its competitors on the probability of an
affirmative decision and the expected gains from such a decision.6  Xj is Zj’s counterpart
for suspension agreements.  There may be differences in these variables since Xj would
include additional factors affecting the likelihood of a firm accepting a suspension
agreement such as bargaining position (Blonigen (forthcoming, b), 4).  DM(.) is the
expected dumping margin from an affirmative decision. FCADD represents the costs faced
by a firm to file for AD protection in a particular period.  It includes the fixed
administrative costs of filing.  “Finally, y(.) represents the expected discounted net
benefit in future cases from filing this particular case and is assumed to be identical
across j products (Blonigen (forthcoming, b), 5).”
For an explanation of the many scenarios represented in this model see Blonigen
(forthcoming, b).  For the purposes of this paper I will assume functional characteristics
as suggested by the data. Since Rj is nondecreasing by assumption, and we see that the
number of AD petitions have remained at a robust level from 1980-2004, save for a select
few periods as shown in figure 1, it must be the case that the left side of the equation is
increasing to match the increase in filing costs otherwise we would see a decrease in
filings.  Therefore, I assume DM(.) is  an increasing function, which implies pjA(.) is  also
increasing.  We also observe that the probability of an affirmative AD decision is
increasing over time suggesting that fjA(.) should be a nondecreasing function.  These
                                                
6 See Knetter, Prusa (2003) for a discussion of external factors affecting AD decisions
and margins.
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assumptions are clearly supported by ADD descriptive data and previous analyses of
ADDs.  It is most likely the case that the observed increases in the expected probability
of an affirmative decision and expected gains from such a decision are leading to an
increase in expected profit from a suspension decision.  This would arise from a foreign
firm’s increasing willingness to negotiate for a suspension in order to avoid a dramatic
ADD.




A(CVD(Zk), Zk) + gk
S(Xk) rk
S(Xk) + y(Xk, Zk) > FCCVD + Rj
The set K includes all possible import country combinations for CVDs.  K Õ J since
CVDs are not filed against nonmarket economies, and k Œ K.  gk(.) is the probability of
the superscript indicated result.  rk(.) indicates the expected profits from an affirmative or
suspension result.  CVD(.) is the expected CVD from an affirmative decision.  All other
variables are assumed to be identical to their description in a firm’s ADD decision.  This
is reasonable for Zk and Xk since they are endogenous factors.  I will expand the meaning
of Rj to the the expected threat of CVD or AD retaliation in a given period.  This will not
harm our AD analysis since CVD law has no influence on a firm’s decision to file an
unaligned AD.  Also, the data suggests that CVDs occur in paltry numbers throughout the
world, and are not spreading like AD.  Thus, I will make the assumption that the
retaliation a firm should expect in the form a CVD is relatively close to zero, and not
increasing.  It is key for my analysis to point out that Rj is increasing even though
retaliation in the form of a CVD is near zero.  I am making this assumption because it is
possible that retaliation to a CVD may occur in the form of an ADD, thus a firm must
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take this into account in their decision to file for protection.  My hypothesis is that the left
side of the inequality is not increasing, thus the increasing of Rj is leading to a decline in
CVD filings.  The data shows that CVDs, when affirmative are not fluctuating very much
over time, thus the expected profits from an affirmative CVD decision remain constant
over time.  We also see that the probability of an affirmative decision is unpredictable
and its expected value7 remains relatively constant over time.  This creates a scenario
where the threat to a foreign firm from an affirmative CVD is unchanging over time, thus
their likelihood to negotiate for a repeal of CVD action through suspension agreement
will also remain relatively constant.  Also, since a foreign firm’s gains from avoiding a
CVD are constant, the expected gains to a domestic firm will not fluctuate over time.
The data supports these claims, which demonstrate that the stability of CVD gains cannot
match the increase in CVD filing, thus more and more firms are not filing for CVD
protection.
We would expect that there would exist some constant decrease in filing costs
(FCALIGN) if a firm were to align AD and CVD petitions. Based on the results from the
CVD decision model it is not surprising that firms would almost exclusively petition for a
CVD only if they can align it with an AD petition.  By combining the models for a firm’s
choice to file an AD and a CVD, we can hypothesize as to why the recent trend for firms
who file an AD have chosen not to align it with a CVD.  The left side of the equation is
the sum of the two left sides of the two decision rules.  The right side is the sum of the
two file costs minus some constant quantity, FCALIGN.  The costs of filing for an ADD
and CVD petition are different since different data about imports must be gathered.
                                                
7 Represented by the overlaid best-fit line in figure 2.
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Namely, CVDs require government specific data not necessary for ADD calculation, and
ADDs require firm specific pricing data unneeded for a CVD.  It is still reasonable to
assume some decrease exists in the filing costs since some data is necessary for both
cases, and there would be a decrease in the administrative startup costs for one of the
duties.  For a firm on the margin of filing for CVD protection, the decrease in filing costs
would be just the incentive needed to file.  This explains the high percentage of CVDs
filed being aligned in recent years.  Between 1985 and 1990 it was not as rare of an
occurrence to see a CVD filed independently (on average about 50%), and before 1985 it
was a rarity to see CVDs aligned.  Our CVD model suggests that the fall in CVD filing is
due to the stability of the gains from a CVD making them unable to match increasing
filing costs.  In the years before 1985 in our sample filing costs were low relative to later
years.  Thus, fewer firms were on the margin and did not need the incentive of alignment
to file a CVD petition.  As we move forward in our sample the expected gains from a
CVD have remained constant and filing costs have increased, which has pushed more and
more firms to the margin, and firms on the margin below.  By the end of our sample,
almost every firm has been pushed to, or below, the margin and we see strikingly few
CVD cases being filed.  The ones that are filed are predominately aligned with an ADD
to capture the decrease in filing costs that have become necessary to motivate them to
petition.
We see a relatively high probability of an ADD case being aligned before 1986.  In
this early portion of our sample, expected ADD gains were low relative to later years, and
Rj was also relatively low.  Thus, more firms considering a petition for ADD protection
were on the margin, and the decrease in filing costs from alignment pushed them over.  In
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later years the majority of firms are not on the margin of filing an AD case due to the
increases in their expected gains from petitioning.  Thus, the period from 1986 to 1997
shows the beginning of the increase in firms choosing to substitute completely out of
CVD in favor of independent AD action.  This period represents the establishment of the
climbing in expected ADD gains, and the overshadowing of CVDs by filing costs.  The
fluctuation of alignment of ADDs during this period can be explained by the existence of
many firms on the margin for both ADD and CVD.  These marginal firms are sensitive to
the decrease in filing costs from alignment and minimal changes in their expected gains,
and file sporadically.
Moving to the end of the sample, ADD gains have climbed drastically, and CVDs
are overshadowed by filings costs.  Now we begin to see a steady downward trend in the
probability of ADD cases being aligned.  The state of the average firm’s decision is that
they are well above the margin of filing for ADD protection, and well below the margin
for a CVD.  Thus, the compensation a firm receives through decreased filing costs is no
longer enough to motivate them to align their AD petition with a CVD.  Our model
shows that as perceived costs associated with filing for protection increase over time due
to fear of retaliation and legal changes, CVD returns do not keep pace, and are thus being
phased out by the majority of firms.  We wonder why it is that CVDs do not follow the
recent trend of yielding large duties similar to what is shown by ADDs.
5.  Methodology
One possible hypothesis to explain the difference between CVD and ADD
magnitudes is that subsidization does not distort trade as much as unfair prices, thus
CVDs are expectedly lower than ADDs.  My hypothesis is CVDs cannot be inflated
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because of their inherent differences from AD.  The myriad of discretionary practices that
have been shown to inflate ADDs simply do not exist in CVD law.  Thus, CVDs remain
miniscule in comparison to ADDs even though a desire to realize a degree of protection
similar to that of AD may lie beneath the surface.
Blonigen (forthcoming, b) has shown that the recent trend of large ADDs can be
attributed to the evolution of discretionary practices within the ITA.  I will demonstrate
that even though CVDs are administered by the same agencies as ADDs, their
discretionary practices are paltry in number, and do not display any significant trends.  To
test this theory I have compiled data on each CVD case since1980 as reported in the
Federal Register.  I have data on preliminary, final, and amendment to final ITA
determinations for each CVD case resulting from a petition.  The magnitude and makeup
of each duty is recorded along with the specific firms investigated, product under
investigation, and any discretionary practices used.  For my analysis, I am only concerned
with duties generated by the ITA and factors that significantly affect their magnitude.
Thus, I will only use the ITA’s final determination of firm specific CVDs in my
regressions.  After discarding preliminary decisions and cases where there are
inordinately high CVDs8 or CVDs not recorded in percentage form, and cases against
nonmarket economies that were carried out to establish the precedent of attributing no
duties to these countries,  I am left with nearly 1000 observations.
I believe CVDs can be explained as a function of their case specific attributes.  The
attributes making up a CVD case are identical to those of ADD.  Thus, I will be adhering
                                                
8 For example ITC cases Iran-2,3 reesulted in final duties above 300% ad valorem.  The
next highest duty recorded is a little greater than 100%.  See Federal Register case 51 FR
35679 and 52 FR 41605 for details of the two cases, respectively.
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to the methodology set forth by Blonigen (forthcoming, a) in order to decompose the
factors affecting CVDs in a similar manner.  The differences between our analyses are
dictated by the inherent differences between CVD and AD cases.  I have created dummy
variables indicating the country or region of origin for each case, the product under
investigation, and the existence of discretionary practices used.  The countries and
regions I will use in my regressions to control for country effects on CVDs are the
primary regions targeted by petitioners; 1) Canada, 2) Mexico, 3) Turkey, 4) Other Latin
America, 5) European Union, 6) Korea, 7) Taiwan, and 8)Other Asia.9  A key difference
between CVDs and ADDs becomes clear in this simple categorization of countries of
interest.  The departure between between the two lies in the main countries targeted by
the two different types of duties.  Blonigen (forthcoming, a) was rightly interested to
study the effect of residence in a nonmarket economy had on the ADD received by firms.
He found that a significant increase in the ADD received resulted in cases where the
subject firms exported from a nonmarket economy.  Nonmarket economies are not
subject to CVD action.  The result is that major exporters to the U.S., such as China and
USSR/Russia, are not involved in CVDs.10  “Rest of the World” is the excluded category
                                                
9 “Other Latin America” is comprised of countries from the region, besides Mexico, that
have been subject to CVD action.  They include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela.  Similarly,
“Other Asia” consists of Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  The European Union is made up of its
members, taking into account their date of entry.
10 Instead, we see the inclusion of Turkey, which is not generally considered a major trade
partner with the U.S., but as it pertains to CVD action, Turkey has seen a substantial
number of cases filed against them.  It is interesting to note that Hong Kong and Japan,
which are major trading partners with the U.S., have not been subject to any CVD action,
and will therefore not be included in my regression analysis.  If it is the case that the
governments of China and Japan are historically not subsidizing exporters, this
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and consists of countries and regions such as Israel, South Africa, East European
countries, and Scandinavian countries.
To analyze the fixed effects of the type of product being investigated on the final
CVD received, I have created dummy variables for the products making up the majority
of CVD cases.  The indicator variables will include, 1) Pipes and Tubes, 2) Steel11, 3)
Chemicals, 4) Food, 5) Chemicals, and 6) Textiles and Apparel.  I will also include
dummy variables indicating each cases occurrence in regard to the 1984 and 1988 trade
acts and the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements to control for the effects
of the resulting legal changes.
I will be using a BIA dummy to establish the effects of discretionary practices on
CVDs.  BIA practices consist of the ITA’s use of facts available and adverse facts
available.  Adverse facts available is the use of BIA in “the most adverse possible way.”
In practice, however, there is little difference in the administration of facts and adverse
facts available, therefore BIA will indicate the use of either one.  An interesting
occurrence in the CVD data is the existence of a set of cases against countries that were
not signatories of the WTO at the time of the investigation.  In these cases no ITC injury
determination was required in the attribution of a CVD.  We would expect this to perhaps
yield higher CVDs as punishment for not being a part of the WTO if discretion was
present in CVD calculation.  I have indicated these cases with the dummy variable “no
injury” to see if in this scenario the ITA used some undocumented discretion to inflate
these duties.  I will also include a trend variable which takes on the value of “1” for 1980
                                                                                                                                                
occurrence may lend itself to the hypothesis that CVDs are not being generated to protect
domestic producers when no threat exists.
11 “Steel” includes products such as steel plate, bars, sheet and strip.
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and increases incrementally by year.  This will be used to control for any time related
change in CVDs.  I will also interact BIA with the trend term to see if there is any
significant trend with the ITA’s use of this discretionary practice.
7.  Regression Analysis
To establish the significance of discretionary practices on the overall CVD rate, I
initially regressed the final observed duties on the dummies for BIA and “no injury”.  I
also included trend, trend squared, and trend cubed to capture any consistent change in
CVDs over time and account for the nonlinear fluctuations of CVDs.12 My base
regression, as well as the regressions to follow, implemented a White’s correction to
account for heteroskedasticity that is present in my data due to it being time series data.
The R-squared term for my base regression was a respectable .22.  As expected, BIA was
significant and positive.  Holding all else constant, BIA use leads to an increase of over
19% for final CVDs.  This is a profound increase when we take into account the average
CVD is around 7.9% for final determinations.  All trend terms were significant, and
represent the yearly fluctuations of CVDs.  These terms show an increasing trend in
CVDs beginning at 2.76% in 1980 and reaching a maximum of 11.04% in 1989.
Following 1989, the trend terms show a downward trend in duties until a minimum of
7.54% is reached in 1999.  After this minimum, the trend of CVDs begins to increase
again and reaches 10.37% at the end of our sample.  The most shocking result of this
regression came from the “no injury” dummy.  This variable was significant and
negative.  This rejects my hypothesis that inflated CVDs occur in a case against countries
                                                
12 The nonlinearity of CVDs is clear from figure 4.
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that were not members of the WTO.  This indicates that the ITA is not inflating duties
against these countries.  One possible explanation is that there is in fact no malevolence
within the USDOC, and subsequently no desire for the ITA to inflate duties against these
countries.  Another possibility is that although there is motivation for the ITA to hike up
duties against these countries, there is not enough discretion that can be used in the
calculation of CVDs for the purpose of manipulating them.
To determine if the results of my base regression are valid or if they are instead
explainable by other factors I included country and product specific dummies in my
model.  I began with the inclusion of country specific dummies.  The explanatory power
of this model increased slightly, yielding an R-squared of .28.  BIA remained significant,
and its magnitude only experienced minor changes.  “No injury” cases became significant
at the 1% level, and remained negative.  Interestingly, by controlling for country/region
effects on CVDs “no injury” nearly doubled in magnitude giving the aforementioned
hypotheses more support.  With the exception of the trend cubed variable, the trend
variables remained significant and their terms were similar to my base regression.  The
occurrence of the trend cubed term losing significance in my model suggests that some of
the nonlinear fluctuations in final CVDs can be explained by the country/region of origin
for a case.  Certain regions had a statistically significant effect on final CVDs.13  Since
CVDs are based on government subsidies and depend on the makeup of a particular
country’s trade policies, the effects we see from certain countries on CVDs cannot be
attributed to discretionary practices being used to perpetuate bias or favoritism toward
                                                
13 The results are documented in table 1.
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particular countries.14  This differs from ADDs insofar as ADDs are determined based on
firms’ behavior.  Thus, the increases documented by Blonigen (forthcoming, a) for the
ADDs of firms from nonmarket economies, for example, is most likely due to the ITA’s
use of discretion in such cases.  An important finding in Blonigen’s (forthcoming, a)
analysis was the evolution of discretionary practices in AD cases.  By interacting
discretionary practices with his trend term he found and increasing trend for the effect of
some of these practices.  Namely, he found BIA’s impact on the final duty was increasing
significantly over time.  When I include a BIA and trend interaction variable in my model
for CVDs, it is insignificant and its sign is indeterminate.  Thus, it can be concluded that
BIA is not evolving over time in CVD cases.
Blonigen (forthcoming, a) found in his model of ADDs that the implementation of
the Uruguay Round, when controlling for other trade acts and similar case specific
qualities in ADDs as CVDs, significantly decreased ADDs.  Thus, since the same trade
acts and the Uruguay Rounds also affected CVD law I would expect a similar result in
my model.  When I include dummies indicating a cases occurrence in regard to the 1984
and 1988 trade acts, and the Uruguay Rounds, not only were they insignificant, but they
made the trend variables insignificant.  This suggests the existence of multicolinearity
between the trend variables and trade acts.  Indicating that the introduction of these well-
known trade acts when controlling for other factors did not significantly affect CVDs,
since their effects can be explained by the trend variables.
Next I regressed CVDs on product controls instead of country dummies.15  The
results were similar to that of my regressions with the inclusion of country dummies.  The
                                                
14 The result of “no injury” cases on final duties lends itself to this hypothesis.
15 The results are documented in table 2.
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trend terms remained significant.  Although the trend terms took on different magnitudes
than those of my base regression when we take into account the difference in the constant
term their effects are relatively the same.  BIA remained significant.  Its coefficient
decreased by about 2% indicating that some of the effect of BIA cases can be explained
by controlling for the type of product.  “No injury” remained significant and negative
without changing much from my base regression.  This indicates that the cases making up
this group have a fair amount of product differentiation since their effect is not affected
when we control for product.  The R-squared value increased only slightly over my base
regression.  Thus, controlling for product effects adds little to our ability to explain final
CVDs, and is not as effective as controlling for country effects.  This is a reasonable
occurrence since the magnitude of CVDs is calculated to counteract the effect of
government specific programs. Therefore, we would expect that the variation in CVDs
would be explained better by controlling for different countries since subsidization
depends more on government’s policy than whether certain products, not taking into
account government policy, generally receive different rates of subsidization.  The next
step to explaining final CVDs is to control for country and product effects along with
discretionary practices.
My final regressions included all controls.16  The trade acts have been consistently
insignificant so I excluded them in my first regression.  R-squared went up to .30
signifying that this model has more explanatory power the previous regressions.  The key
variables for my analysis, BIA, “no injury”, and trends, remained significant.  In order to
see if controlling for all possible observable case specific attributes affected the
                                                
16 The results are documented in table 3.
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significance of the trade act variables I included them in my final regression.  This added
nothing to the explanatory power, and decreased the significance of the trend terms to the
10% level.  This collateral impact of including all dummies is well worth the
completeness of case specific factors represented in this model.  We see that BIA has
changed very little from the base model.  Its significance and magnitude are a valuable
indication of the effect of the ITA’s use of discretion on final CVD rates. The trend terms
explain the nonlinear systematic fluctuations in CVDs.  The changes we see in their
coefficients indicate CVDs increase and decrease in the same fashion as explained in the
base regression section.  However the changes in coefficients suggest the peak in the
trend increase of CVDs occurred in 1988 where it reaches a maximum of 12.16%.  The
trend then decreases until 2000 in this model, and reaches a minimum of 7.6%.  From
then until the end of the sample in 2004 there is an increasing trend in CVDs ending at
10.37%.  The interaction term of BIA and trend was, as in all other regressions,
insignificant. Indicating that there is no systematic change in the effect of BIA use on
CVDs.  It is important to note Blonigen’s (forthcoming, a) findings in his study of ADDs.
He found the use of BIA led to a 30-32% increase in ADDs after controlling for similar
factors.  He also found that there existed an increasing trend in the effect of BIA on
ADDs suggesting that discretionary practices were evolving over time.  This difference is
key to understanding the differences between ADD and CVD magnitudes.  “No injury”
remained negative and significant in my model.  Its coefficient decreased to –4.25%.
This result stands as a demonstration that excluding the use of BIA discretion probably
does not play much of a part in the ITA’s CVD calculations.  Certain country/region and
product dummies were significant.  It seems clear that unless BIA is attributed to a case
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the ITA is not using discretion to influence CVDs, thus significant coefficients for certain
countries/regions and products suggests that these areas and products are being
subsidized at different rates than others.17
8. Conclusion
In comparison to its volatile counterpart, AD, CVDs seem dull in nature.  They
yield consistent rates, and do not fluctuate as much as ADDs.  I have argued that the
predictability and stability of CVDs is due to the lack of programs allowing the ITA to
use discretion in their calculations and the inexistence of an increasing trend in the
program employed.  ADDs are administered quite differently.  There are many
methodological outlets for discretion along with a plethora of programs frequently
invoked that yield higher duties.18  In accordance with the existence of these programs,
there is a documented trend increasing the effect of these practices on ADDs.  Thus, we
see boisterous duties and not surprisingly a consistently high number of ADD cases.  It is
no wonder that scholars of late have been enticed more into studying AD than CVD
practices and consequences. CVD law is rigid, and has undergone little change since
1979.  The changes it has undergone through well known trade acts I have shown led to
statistically insignificant affects in the final CVD rate.  A possible demonstration of CVD
law suppressing CVDs occurs in the existence of a set of cases against countries, which
were not members of the WTO.  I would have expected that if the ITA could manipulate
CVDs, increased duties would occur in this set of cases.  In fact, these cases actually
                                                
17 The impact of country/region and products on CVDs when controlling for the other
discussed factors are documented in table 3.
18 Consult section 2.2 for descriptions of these programs, and Blonigen (forthcoming, a)
for evidence of the effects of these programs on ADDs.
29
exhibited decreased duties leading me to believe that CVDs are accurately representing
what has been deemed necessary to counteract the harm of foreign subsidization to the
domestic producers.19
It came as no surprise that when the ITA is allowed to relax the strict
methodologies in CVD calculation through BIA there resulted in a significant increase in
CVD rates. Although the effect of BIA seems like an enticing prospect to domestic firms,
the lack of a significant trend driving BIA’s effect on CVDs lends itself to explain why
firms most likely view expected gains from a CVD unchanging.  BIA seems trapped by
precedent and methodology since it has not evolved over time. The data used in this
paper to establish the effect of BIA on CVDs did not account for the differences that may
exist in the two programs making up BIA.  I would like to separate these two programs in
further analyses of CVDs to more thoroughly establish the effect of this practice on final
CVDs.  Even in light of this shortcoming, my regressions show CVDs are fairly
accurately explained by case specific data, and the results of these regressions support my
hypothesis from section 4 that firms are substituting away from CVDs because their
expected gains are approximately unchanging from period to period.
It may be the case that discretion manifests itself differently in CVD cases than AD
cases.  It seems from the description of AD calculations20 that inflations in ADDs occur
when the ITA is forced to make inferences about the magnitudes of values in their duty
calculations.  Except for the case of BIA, the values necessary to calculate CVDs are
provided to the ITA.  Instead discretion may be occurring in the types of programs the
                                                
19 Whether or not what the ITA deems necessary to counteract subsidization is correct (as
addressed by Anspacher et. al. (1991)) is a separate issue.
20 See section 2.2 ADD Calculation.
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ITA analyzes for subsidization.  For instance the benefit of exchange rate programs
granted to exporters are more difficult to observe and complicated to calculate in
comparison to direct subsidies such as equity infusions.  Further research to determine the
effect on final CVDs of programs such as these on the ITA’s duty calculations would be
intriguing.  My database documents the types of programs determined by the ITA to
make up each duty.  This lends itself to an analysis of the effect of particular programs on
CVDs, and one could analyze the makeup of the average CVD in order to determine if
there is a trend of these programs existing in particular cases.21  Consider the possibility
that the ITA is searching for programs such as exchange rate programs more rigorously
when a case is against a large trading partner.  If the ITA manifests discretion in CVD
cases by digging deeper for programs in cases against large trading partners, the negative
coefficient we observed in “no injury” cases may be explained by further research.  If it
were demonstrated that these countries who were not part of the WTO at the time of their
investigation accounted for a relatively small amount of U.S. imports, and a lower
number of programs that are more difficult to observe and calculate occurred, one could
argue that the ITA is behaving differently on a case by case basis.  It would also be
interesting to further investigate BIA practices in CVD. There are obviously many
interesting avenues of research to shed more light on CVDs in the pursuit of further
unraveling the forces driving this trade practice.
                                                
21 The database could also effectively be used to address concerns put forth by Anspacher
et. al. (1991).  The authors demonstrated that CVDs counteracting domestic subsidies as
calculated by the ITA most likely frequently over estimate the actual duty needed.
Determining the proportion of CVDs made up by domestic subsidies would substantiate
the level of their concerns.
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Figure 5:







































































































































































Trend 3.000 1.818 1.571
(0.823)*** (0.759)** (1.549)
Trend Squared -0.251 -0.137 -0.155
(0.076)*** (0.067)** (0.154)
Trend Cubed 0.006 0.003 0.004
(0.002)*** (0.002) (0.004)
No Injury -2.712 -4.708 -4.557
(1.090)** (1.648)*** (1.681)***














Other Latin America 9.396 9.182
(1.572)*** (1.498)***




1984 Trade Act -0.201
(2.433)




Constant -2.911 -1.293 0.073
(2.358) (2.432) (3.574)
Observations 1000 987 987
R-squared 0.22 0.28 0.29
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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and Trade Act specific
dummies
Trend 3.000 2.846 5.953
(0.978)*** (0.856)*** (2.379)**
Trend Squared -0.251 -0.236 -0.560
(0.086)*** (0.074)*** (0.217)***
Trend Cubed 0.006 0.005 0.014
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)**
BIA 19.701 18.140 17.013
(2.393)*** (3.032)*** (2.815)***
No Injury -2.712 -2.265 -2.743
(0.955)*** (1.075)** (1.212)**














1984 Trade Act -3.790
(3.500)




Constant -2.911 -2.838 -9.018
(2.763) (2.414) (5.560)
Observations 1000 1000 1000
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Trend Squared -0.150 -0.334
(0.063)** (0.175)*


















Other Latin America 10.136 9.889
(1.510)*** (1.456)***
Other Asia 4.530 4.191
(1.628)*** (1.603)***












1984 Trade Act -1.878
(3.068)








Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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